

175 territory of the whole Western Desert. They were also
648 exempted from land taxes, military duty, and forced labor on
[651] the irrigation projects of the Nile River. In return for
these privileges, the Bedouins were expected to guard the
frontiers of Egypt and to furnish warriors for the expeditionary
forces of Muhammed 'Ali. The Pasha, who was in the process
of carving out his own empire independent of the Ottomans,
needed warriors, a role which traditionally excluded the
fallahin of the Nile Valley. Bedouin horsemen from the
Western Desert fought with Muhammad 'Ali in his Wahhabi
campaign of 1815 in Arabia. They also aided the Pasha's son,
Ismail, in the conquest of the Sudan.

Muhammad 'Ali instituted the practice of granting to
the Bedouin leaders land in the rich Nile Valley. He made
it explicit that the leaders were to dwell upon this land:
their role, as it was officially stated, was to provide a
liaison between the Pasha and the tribes. In fact, the
leaders were hostages. By controlling them, Muhammad 'Ali
was able to exert proper pressure on the Bedouins when and
where it was needed (Baer 1957:84-98).

175 Bedouins did not pay land taxes, but neither did they
648 "own" the land; they simply had the right of usufruct. The
651 law stated that only those who paid land taxes had the right
423 to purchase and own their land. But along with ownership of
land came the onerous responsibilities of corvée labor on the

175 Nile dikes and military conscription. The term "Bedouin"
648 came to mean, as it was defined by the government of Egypt,
651 one who did not legally own land and hence was not subject to
423 forced labor or military service. On this basis, the Director
[162] of Recruiting Office in a 1904 census distinguished three kinds
of Bedouin (Murray 1935:31):

290,095 - settled and living in their own farm colonies
240,880 - living among the fallahin
70,472 - real Bedouin or nomads

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175 By the end of the 19th century, Bedouin society had
177 undergone a great deal of change. Politically, the Bedouins
648 were subordinates in a dominant-subjective authority relation-
ship with the central regime of the Nile Valley. As a result
of external political control, nomadism was curtailed and the
Bedouins were forced to settle on the land to raise what few
crops they could. These new political and economic conditions
are the major aspects of the sedentarization process. Bedouin
dependence on the central authority of Egypt and their reliance
on horticulture increased with time. Nor did the entry of
Britain into Egypt in 1882 change the material and social
condition of the Bedouin.

175 The British, in the style of the politics of colonial-
648 ism, reorganized the administrative structure of Egypt. The
Western Desert was given the status of a province; command

While the Bedouins

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[778] respect the Sanusi family they, nevertheless, wear their religion lightly. An informant, speaking of the merits and demerits of the conservative Muslim Brethern Association, said that "you should never listen to a holy man, for he will lead you straight to hell!" But upon meeting any member of the Sanusi family, all Bedouins greet him by kissing his hand. Besides a show of deference, this ritual act, in theory, transfers baraka from al-Sanusi to the layman.

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641 The citizenship exemptions granted the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali have been rescinded by Abd al-Nasser. This has been one aspect of his program to imbue the Bedouin with political consciousness and promote participation in the nation-state. The Bedouins say that this is the way it should be: they want the right to own land and to accept the responsibility of defending the homeland. But they still do not pay land taxes, and they feel justified in this because the desert "is very poor soil, and not like that of the Nile." Nor do they always heed the call to military duty, though they insist that they do.

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423 Egyptian land reform laws would be impractical, or impossible to apply, in al-Qasr. In the Nile Valley, such laws were necessary. The majority of the Egyptian peasants can survive on less than one acre of land, and farms of under five acres comprise 44 per cent of the agricultural land area in the Nile Valley (Warriner 1962:204). Plots this

There was some smuggling
439 of goods across the Libyan border, but this smuggling was done on a
648 very small scale. Before the Egyptian government imposed restrictions
on imports, the prices of the goods in the Libyan market were close to
their prices on the Egyptian market. Except for a very few items which
were not found on the Egyptian market, smuggling goods from Libya offered
653 a very limited financial gain to the smugglers. In recent years, this
situation has changed, however. With population increase in Egypt
threatening disaster, and with the cultivable land in the valley reaching
its maximum productivity, the attention of the government was drawn to
the fertile yet dry land of the northern strip of the Western Desert as
a possible means of expanding the cultivated area. A number of projects
are taking place at the present time under the land reclamation act. The
most important of these projects is the Eastern Mariut project which is
directed toward the irrigation of the lands of the Western Desert
through the channelling of the flood waters of the Nile into a network
of canals covering an extensive area of the northern strip of the Western
Desert. Also, recently, oil has been discovered in the area, and since
315 the end of the Second World War, the area has been a major attraction
457 for tourists.

439 More important is the increase in traffic of smuggled goods from
Libya. Custom restrictions on imported goods to Egypt have created a
651 scarcity of American and British manufactured goods which raised their
656 price on the Egyptian market and made smuggling a profitable activity.
An opposite-direction smuggling of sheep and goats from Egypt to Libya
created a great shortage in the Egyptian meat market. Before the dis-
covery of oil in Libya, the Western Desert area supplied the Egyptian

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[173] Such traditions differentiate between these segments which otherwise occupy an equivalent position in the formal system.

This level of segmentation has no particular political significance except that it is at this level that the client tribes of Murabiteen are attached. People in the area differentiate between Awlad Ali proper, who are called the Sa'adi, and the Murabiteen tribes. Murabiteen tribes occupy a special position which tends to complicate the formal analysis of the tribal organization of the Awlad Ali. The Murabiteen are a number of tribes of varying sizes and origin which are attached to the Sa'adi tribes as their vassals or clients. They exhibit the same principles of tribal organization as the Sa'adi tribes except that they have no common origin similar to that of the latter groups.

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173 The original division of the Murabiteen tribes among the Sa'adi was made in the famous meeting at El-Haqfa in which the division of land was also made and the Awlad Ali law was first enacted. The number of client groups attached to each Sa'adi tribe reflects the relative prestige and power of that particular tribe at the time of the meeting. Having a relatively large number of client tribes meant, in addition to prestige of the patron tribe, large financial support. Until half a century ago this financial support was in the form of an obligatory tribute or

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651 "sadaqa" which the client tribes had to pay. This tribute is no longer
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[431] mandatory, but the client groups are still expected to present members of their patron tribes with gifts on occasions such as weddings, funerals or feasts of the tribal saint. Large vassal groups also meant support in fights. Although the client groups did not constitute part of the vengeance group of their Sa'adi, when the Sa'adi tribe fought, their client

619 The picture was reversed then with the poor Sa'adi shepherds becoming
184 the masters, acquiring great wealth and prestige because of their fight-
174 ing ability, and the holymen becoming the shepherds and clients of the
792 Sa'adi fighters. In the old inter-tribal wars, the Murabiteen stood a
• [651] very limited chance so the Sa'adi tribes adopted them and in return for
a yearly tribute guaranteed the protection of the Murabiteen from ex-
ternal aggression.

As time passed, the main difference between the Sa'adi and Murabiteen
tended to diminish. One or two outstanding Murabiteen tribes fought their
own battles without seeking the protection of the Sa'adi and remained in-
dependent, while a few others rose up and fought on with the protector
against a common foe (the case of the Gemei'at tribe is an example) and
in return were emancipated from the stigma of serfdom and accepted by the
Sa'adi as almost equals. Other Murabiteen tribes remained attached to
their Sa'adi protector as client groups.

Ibn Khaldoun also saw the inferiority of the Murabiteen tribes as
stemming from a mode of tribal relations adapted to inter-tribal warfare
(1845).

613 The Eila

The Eila represents the next level of tribal segmentation among the
Awlad Ali. The Eila is the most important political unit. Although the
Eila lacks any formally recognized leadership, its importance stems from
the fact that it constitutes the vengeance group or Amar El-Dam (unity of
613 the blood). This means that it bears a corporate responsibility for the
672 actions of its members. Anyone of its members can be killed in vengeance
682 for a homicide committed by any other, and the duty of revenge for any

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The situation is quite different in the Western Desert. Although it is the government, represented by the province council, which makes the final decision in appointing the omda or sheikh, yet this appointment is made on the basis of nominations given by the tribal segment or segments which he would represent. Since the tribal segment usually nominates one person, the decision of the council is limited to the examination of the credentials of the nominee and to see if he meets the basic requirements of the law. If a certain nominee is rejected by the council, a very rare occurrence, the matter goes back to the tribal segment to make another nomination. In practice, then, the omda of the Western Desert is elected by the people and the appointment by the government of the omda is significant only in cases where the omda is to represent more than one small tribal segment and each nominates one. Here the council has to choose between the various nominees and appoints the qualified. Unlike the omda of the village, the tribal omda is a real representative of his people. Despite the fact that he becomes part of a governmental structure, his basic function is to look after the interest of his tribal group. Or, as one informant put it, "The omda is the servant of the people." In many cases the best interest of the tribal segment is served through full cooperation of the omda with the government. So far there seems to be very little conflict between the interest of the tribal populations and that of the government. There is very little in the area that the government demands or needs. There is no taxable land to speak of. There are only a few acres of barley land and even these are minimally taxed. The main responsibility of the omda to the government is to report births and deaths and give a yearly list of young men

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THE BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA

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the east began in the middle of the thirteenth century and has lasted to the present day. It is intimately bound up with the pilgrimage to the sacred towns of Islam. Round these pious men and round their tombs gathered for sanctuary the simple and oppressed, and from these and from the children of the holy men have sprung the *Marabtin bil baraka* tribes. The other client tribes have no sacred associations and are known as *Marabtin al-sadqan* because they pay *sadaqa*, a fee, to a free tribe for protection and for the privilege of using the earth and water. Some small broken-up fragments of this category on the plateau, such as the 'Awwama, Alauna, Hasanna, and some of the Qat'an and Sa'it, even to-day have a very inferior social position and are forced to make payments to, and to perform services for, the free tribes among whom they live. Other tribes of this second category live, as already mentioned; on territory which is to all intents and purposes their own and have long since ceased to pay a fee. This is especially the case to the east, in 'Abaidat tribal territory, where such client tribes as the Minifa, Qat'an, Taraki, and Huta live with independent status. In the west also the Fawakhir and Zuwaya are too powerful and warlike to accept overlordship. Also, the more nomadic groups in Cyrenaica are mostly client tribes and, like all nomads, resent any control or authority. Whatever the free tribes may say about them, they regard themselves as independent.

The provenance of the *Sa'adi* tribes and of some of the *Marabtin* tribes is shown together with the distribution of the Sanusiya lodges on the map facing page 35, and the approximate numbers of these tribes, and of a few others not shown on the map, are listed below.

<i>Sa'adi</i>		<i>al-Zuwaya</i>		
al-'Abaidat	30,450	al-Shwa'ir	3,400	
al-'Awaqir	27,500	al-Fawakhir	3,300	
al-Bara'asa	21,000	al-Sa'it	2,900	
al-Darsa	18,850	al-Majabra	2,500	
al-Magharba	13,000	al-Minifa	2,500	
al-'Arafa	9,300	al-Masamir	2,400	
al-'Abid	6,850	al-Awajila	2,300	
al-Hasa	6,500	Aulad al-Shaikh	1,650	
'Ailat Fayid	100	al-'Aqail	1,400	
		al-Shahaibat	1,350	
<i>Marabtin</i>		al-Sarahna	1,250	
al-Qat'an	5,850	al-Qabail	1,150	
al-'Awwama	3,800	al-Huta	1,150	

THE TURKISH ADMINISTRATION

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tion were compelled to pay taxes and furnish supplies, and how forty-five of the Shaikhs of the Jawazi tribe were treacherously murdered and many of their followers massacred.¹ Generally, however, it may be said that Cyrenaica has no history, other than Bedouin traditions of inter-tribal wars, from 1051 to 1835, in which year the Turks regained control of Libya from the Caramanlis. On their return they instituted a more systematic administration than had been exercised during their earlier occupation.

The Turks returned to Cyrenaica about the time the Grand Sanusi first visited the country and eight years after their reoccupation he founded his first zawiya on the plateau. As the Sanusiya Order gained the confidence of the Bedouin and became accepted as their spokesmen, it was necessary for the Ottoman authorities to take it into consideration in their dealings with the tribes of the interior. The Order made it possible for the different tribes to express themselves politically as a unit for the first time in their relations with the outside world. The tribes provided the Order with a social system, and the Order gave to that system a political organization at a time when it was beginning to be brought into more direct contact with political forces outside tribal society.

The Sanusiya is known to have been given a Charter about 1856 by Sultan 'Abd al-Majid I. His firman was brought from Istanbul by Sidi 'Abd al-Rahim al-Maghbub, later Shaikh of the Sanusiya zawiya at Banghazi, who had been sent to Istanbul for the purpose and had the utmost difficulty, as was often the case with visitors to the Ottoman capital, in obtaining an audience with the Sultan. Whatever other privileges the firman conferred on the Order—I have not seen the document—it certainly exempted its properties from taxation and permitted it to collect a religious tithe from its followers. A second firman was issued later by Sultan 'Abd al-Majid's brother, Sultan 'Abd al-'Aziz, and was brought from Istanbul to the Governor of Tripoli by Sidi Abu al-Qasim al-'Isawi, 'Abd al-Rahim's successor in the Banghazi lodge. There is in the Land Registry at Banghazi a letter from the Governor of Tripoli to the Governor of Banghazi giving the essence of this firman. It confirms the privileges granted by the earlier firman and adds to them that

¹ Op. cit., *passim* and p. 220 seq.

THE TURKISH ADMINISTRATION

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The local Turkish officials were content for the most part to sit in the towns, many of them no doubt regretting that they had ever been sent to Cyrenaica, where their salaries were low and often in arrears, and to let the Sanusiya control the interior so long as taxes were paid and no overt act was committed against the Sultan's authority which might bring them to the notice of the Court; and the Central Government for its part was quite prepared to forget that Cyrenaica formed part of the Sultan's dominions so long as there was peace there and it sent annual tribute to Istanbul. The Turks were indifferent otherwise to what happened in Libya, which was a poor province, particularly the Cyrenaican part of it, where their administration was even less efficient than in Tripolitania, where it was happy-go-lucky enough. They had quite enough troubles elsewhere without alienating to no purpose a powerful Islamic Order and the warlike Bedouin who supported it. They therefore left the Sanusiya to perform many of the functions of government in the interior—education, justice, the maintenance of security, and even to some extent the collection of taxes, though in the matter of tribute there were difficulties, for Bedouin do not willingly pay taxes to anyone, and since they already paid a tithe to the Sanusiya, with a grace which contrasted with their reluctance to pay taxes to the Turkish Administration, they were disinclined to pay twice. When any question arose which required direct contact between the Head of the Order and the local Governor it was established through the Shaikh of the lodge at Banghazi, or a special messenger was sent from Jaghub or Kufra to the Turkish Governor at Banghazi, or he sent a messenger to the Head of the Order in his oasis seat. From time to time the Central Government sent an envoy to the Head of the Order with gifts and instructions to report on what was going on in the Sahara, and on such occasions he was received handsomely and returned with the blessings of the *Shaikh al-Tariqa* on the Sultan. Sometimes, as we have seen, the Head of the Order sent a deputation to Istanbul.

The payment of taxes and the maintenance of peace and communications, the only two functions of government the Turkish officials bothered their heads about, were intimately connected. Minor quarrels among the Bedouin themselves little interested them, but armed resistance to taxation was certain to earn

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THE TURKISH ADMINISTRATION

- *175 them a reprimand on the double count of decrease in revenue
*648 and lack of security. It was essential, therefore, to get the
• 651 Bedouin to pay their taxes without making too much trouble
about doing so. To this end the Turkish administrative organiza-
tion was largely directed. In 1879 the *Vilayet* of Banghazi was,
*175 in matters of civil administration, finally separated from that of
*648 Tripoli and in 1888 became an autonomous *sanjaq* directly
631 dependent on Istanbul. It was governed by a *mutasarrif*
nominated by, and directly responsible to, the Central Govern-
ment. On him depended all the officials of the Administration,
though the chief among them were appointed by the Imperial
Government. The senior officials were usually Turks. The
*175 country was divided for administrative purposes into a number
*648 of districts, each under a *qaimaqam*, except that of Banghazi,
634 which came directly under the Governor himself; and all except
the Aujila-Jalu and Kufra districts were further divided into
sub-districts under mudirs. These districts and sub-districts
*175 followed tribal divisions and subdivisions as any administra-
*648 tion in Cyrenaica must do, since the tribes and their sections
634 are the fundamental social departments of the country. Hence
619 sections of a nomadic tribe might be residing at any time in a
sub-district different to that to which they were administra-
tively attached, and even in a different district.
- *175 In his direction of the affairs of the administration, finances,
*648 and police, the Governor was assisted by an administrative
631 council composed of the chief accountant, the secretary, the
qadi, the mufti, and four elected members from the local popula-
tion. Each *qaimaqam*, nominated by the Imperial Government,
had an administrative council similarly composed. The mudirs,
nominated by the Imperial Government on the proposal of the
Governor, had no council established by statute but co-opted
tribal Shaikhs when they wanted their advice or co-operation.
In the towns there was a representative, called *mukhtar*,
elected by the property-owning citizens for each ward, and at
Banghazi and Darna there were urban councils of a simple
kind.
- *175 It was the mudir in charge of a sub-district who had direct
*648 dealings with the Bedouin tribes and the lodges of the Sanusiya
634 Order. In 1911, just before the Italian invasion, there were six
districts including Kufra, which came nominally under the

THE TURKISH ADMINISTRATION

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Turkish administration in 1910, and the Banghazi district, which came directly under the Governor of Cyrenaica for administration. Attached to each district were the sub-districts shown in the list below,¹ in which the tribes attached to each sub-district are also given. The Bara'asa came under Banghazi, although they lived well to the east, for political reasons, the tribe being exceptionally rebellious.²

Districts	Sub-districts	Tribes
Banghazi (directly dependent on the Governor)	Suluq Qaminis Barsis Sidi Khalifa Slanta	'Awaqir
al-Marj	al-Marj al-Haniya	Bara'asa 'Arafa and 'Abid Darsa
Darna	al-Sallum Tubruq al-Banba al-Qubba Shahhat	'Abaidat
Ajadabiya	Marsa Braiqa	Hasa Magharba
Aujila and-Jalu	—	Awajila and Majabra
Kufra	—	—

The administration was very slapdash by European standards. Indeed, Shaikh Muhammad 'Uthman says darkly: 'There is at Banghazi no organization, political, administrative, or financial. I say no more about this matter: it will be understood why.'³ This was, of course, an exaggeration, for however simple the administration may have been, and perhaps for that reason, it worked—with a good deal of grumbling it is true, but without undue conflict. Revenue was collected and would have exceeded the cost of the very cheap administration of the country if the proceeds of some taxes had not been sent to Istanbul. Much of this revenue came from import and export duties, but the bulk of it was derived from taxes on herds and a tenth of the harvest in kind, the collection of which was in the hands of the mudirs. It was the task of these mudirs, who were generally literate

¹ *Notizie relative al Sangiacato della Cirenaica e alle Mudirie dipendenti dal Mutassarifato di Bengasi* (Ufficio Politico Militare), 1913.

² Fabrizio Serra, *Italia e Senussia*, 1933, p. 17; *idem* in *La Cirenaica*, 1922-3, p. 182.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.

THE TURKISH ADMINISTRATION

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[793] Arabs, to assess and collect taxes, to maintain security, and to control the few police allotted to them. In this task they expected co-operation from the local Shaikhs of the tribal sections and the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya lodges.

It is remarkable that the Bedouin paid any taxes at all, for the mudirs had not sufficient force at their command, nor had the Governor at Benghazi, to compel the Bedouin to pay if they were determined not to do so. The mudir of Slanta had only 50

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[625] to 60 soldiers in his sub-district and the Bara'asa whom he administered could have annihilated this force with ease, as could the 'Awaqir the 50 soldiers and the handful of police stationed at Suluq. That taxes were collected at all, and all the

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619 more that they were collected without constant disturbance, is to be accounted for partly by the recognition by the Shaikhs of the tribal sections, with whom the mudirs were careful to keep on good personal terms, that there was a moral obligation to pay them; but there were also sanctions if they were not paid.

If the Shaikh of a tribal section did not collect the taxes due from that section, he was held responsible and action could be taken against him personally. The mudir, accompanied by a small armed force, went a round of the tribal sections attached to his sub-district each year, generally in springtime, and sent out other tax-collecting parties in other directions. Sometimes special tax commissions appointed by the Governor also toured the country. A favourite device was for such parties to quarter themselves in the camp of a recalcitrant Shaikh and to reside there as his guests, for the soldiers and police carried few provisions, till the tax was paid. The Shaikhs, on the other hand, were made partners in the undertaking by, besides investment with an official robe and status, receiving a percentage of the taxes collected, the mudir himself also taking a percentage. Moreover, each Shaikh whose section paid the tax was determined that the other sections should not escape paying as well. A Shaikh was able to divide up the assessment on his section among the minor Shaikhs, and the minor Shaikhs among yet smaller ones. It was in the interest of each Shaikh to see that the smaller ones did not escape their share and leave him with the responsibility for a deficit. Responsibility was in this way passed down the tribal structure. On the whole the system worked well and the Turkish officials and the Bedouin did not

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THE TURKISH ADMINISTRATION

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get on badly together. Each understood the other. Also there was much elasticity in the taxes which appealed to the Bedouin who prefer to pay a heavy tax one year and lightly or not at all another year, rather than to pay a regular and inevitable tax. The assessments were seldom revised and often had little relation to the capacity of a tribal section to pay. The result was that taxes were always in arrears and in some years, or for some sections, remitted altogether. Those sections nearest the Turkish posts paid the more easily because they were the more vulnerable. Some of the more nomadic Bedouin escaped payment altogether, or at any rate for years at a stretch. It is, I think, safe to assume that the taxes actually collected over a number of years were light. Otherwise the Bedouin would not have paid them.

Perhaps the chief reason why taxes were collected without constant rebellion was the support given to the administration in this matter by the Sanusiya. The Turks held the coastal towns and a few inland posts outside which their direct control of the country was restricted to those Bedouin who lived a fairly stable life in the immediate vicinity of these centres. The rest of the country was left to the Sanusiya and its own devices, though, as we have seen, the Turks sent occasional patrols into the interior. Sporadically, without much enthusiasm or perseverance, the Administration at one time tried to extend its effective control into the hinterland by nominating to official posts, and giving arms and money to, selected tribal chiefs, such as the Shaikhly families of Hadduth, Lataiwish, and Saif al-Nasir. Bu Bakr bin Hadduth of the Bara'asa was made *qaimaqam* of al-Qaiqab, where he had a castle; 'Ali Lataiwish of the Magharba was made *qaimaqam* of Sirt, where he, also, had a castle; and the fierce old warrior chieftain of the Aulad Suliman, Saif al-Nasir, was made mudir of Bu Njaim. This procedure resulted in brigandage rather than in good administration and was in the main discarded. Instead the mudirs worked directly through the Shaikhs of the tribal sections and, especially when dealing with intertribal and intersectional affairs, through the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya zawiyas. Some of the older notables of Banghazi have told me that the Pasha, as the Governor was often called, would never have succeeded in collecting taxes among the Bedouin had it not been for the co-operation of the

THE TURKISH ADMINISTRATION

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Hheads of the Sanusiya lodges, who often accompanied the mudirs and tax commissioners to the Shaikhs of the tribal sections attached to their lodges. It was to the common interest of the Turkish Administration and of the Sanusiya that there should be order, security, justice, and trade in the country, and they co-operated to maintain them.

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The Turkish officials did their utmost to remain on good terms with the Sanusiya Shaikhs and to this end, and doubtless also because they found no difficulty in accepting, as educated men, its exalted teachings, some of them affiliated themselves to the Order. Membership of it gave them prestige in the eyes of the Bedouin as great, if not greater, than their official status gave them. Likewise the more prosperous merchants who had dealings with the Bedouin tribes or sent caravans to the Sahara and Sudan found it advisable to be received into the Order. It is for this reason that in all the towns of Libya we find a small body of the richer and more cultured citizens ascribed to the Order, while the common people belong to other or no Orders.

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But though the administration of Cyrenaica might be called at this period a Turco-Sanusi condominium there was an undercurrent of jealousy on both sides which occasionally gave rise to open conflict. A sure occasion was any effort on the part of the Administration to tax the Sanusiya estates. Although these had been exempted from taxation by the Sultan's firman, the local administration made rare and unsuccessful efforts to exact taxation on them. When in 1908 they tried to tax the crops of the Sanusiya holdings a tribal meeting, attended by 150 Shaikhs headed by Umar bu Rqaia of the Darsa tribe, met at the zawiya of al-Haniya and decided not to pay any more tribute to the Turkish Government till it revoked the tax. The Government then dropped the matter, though the trouble continued till 1910. Earlier, the Governor Ahmad Pasha Zuhadi (1904-5), acting on instructions from Istanbul, had tried to impose a tax on the crops of tribesmen and zawiya alike. The Bedouin round al-Marj had thereupon attacked a Turkish detachment charged with collecting the tax and sent them back to Benghazi stripped of everything they possessed. The outcome was that the Governor was relieved of his office.

¹ Capt. Emilio Canevari, *Za'wie ed Ichuan Senussiti della Tripolitania*, 1917, *passim*.

THE TURKISH ADMINISTRATION

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The Sanusiya thus used the Turks to buttress its position in its dealings with the tribes, and combined with the tribes to resist any encroachments on its prerogatives by the Turkish Government. It was in the interests of both Administration and Order that the tribes should not get out of hand, and it was in the interests of tribes and Order that the Administration should not become too powerful. The Sanusiya acquired from its central position between the other two parties a pre-eminence in the interior which led to the tribal system becoming already in Turkish times a proto-state with an embryonic government of its own. The tribes first began to see themselves as a nation through the Sanusiya's relations with the Turkish Administration. They were all 'Sanusi' *vis-à-vis* the Administration.

Ultimately it was the tribes who called the tune to both the Turkish Government and the Sanusiya Order. It would have taken a well-equipped army to have subdued them had they made a united revolt, and the Governor had only a meagre force at his disposal and could have had little hope of receiving much assistance from Istanbul. The Order had only moral weapons and though the tribal Shaikhs received its instructions with respect and every sign of acquiescence they did not necessarily act on them. Both Administration and Order were therefore compelled to compromise in their dealings with the tribes, who were, as Bedouin always are, at heart opposed to any interference and restriction. A typical situation of the latter days of Turkish rule was that described to me by the Banghazi notable 'Umar al-Kakhiya, at one time a member of the Ottoman House of Representatives. He was sent by the Governor of Cyrenaica to make agreements with the tribes in the eastern and western wings of the country by which they should refrain from cutting the Government's telegraph wires, a Bedouin habit which was later to irritate the Italian authorities and during the late war British Signals. I mention two further incidents in illustration of Turco-Bedouin relations. About 1895 forty members of the Tamiya section of the Bara'asa tribe jointly killed a tax-collector, a certain 'Abd al-Rahman al-Katib, for, among other affronts, having taxed the client tribes directly instead of through their *Sa'adi* overlords. They then fled to the Marmarica, from where they treated with the Turkish Authorities for a settlement by payment of 13,000 Riyal, or thirteen times the usual blood money, to the dead man's son.

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THE SECOND ITALO-SANUSI WAR

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ments and plans was soon passed on to the guerrilla bands, for Sidi 'Umar al-Mukhtar had agents in every Italian post. Those *sottomessi* who were armed and paid by the Italians to protect their territories against Patriot foraging expeditions would be found among the Patriot casualties after skirmishes with Italian patrols. The submitted population, it was discovered, allowed their horses to graze far from their camps so that the Patriots could borrow them for operational purposes. The Patriots sold their animals in Italian and Egyptian markets through their submitted kinsmen, and Italian efforts to keep track of such transactions through tribal markings were, as might be supposed, unavailing. So useful, indeed, was a submitted population to the Patriots that the tribal Shaikhs sometimes arranged among themselves who among them should submit and who take the field. Even most of the Cyrenaican officials in the Italian administration did what was consistent with their safety to help their own people against their employers. Their faith unfaithful kept them falsely true. In the end the Italians came to the conclusion that they could trust no Cyrenaican, least of all a Cyrenaican Bedouin. The hearts of all were with their fighting fellow countrymen and fellow Muslims. The *sottomessi* and *ribelli* alike were all Bedouin, jealous of each other and hostile to tribes other than their own, but united by blood and a common way of life—one faith, one speech, one law. All regarded the Italians as foreigners whom one may serve but not love. 'The entire population thus took part directly or indirectly in the rebellion', wrote Graziani.¹

The lot of the submitted sections was unenviable. They were compelled to live near Italian posts and their areas of sowing and pasturing were severely restricted. Their camps were subjected to constant inspections. Hostages were taken. Horses were confiscated. If it was discovered that they had dealings of any kind with their kinsmen in the Patriot bands they were heavily fined in animals and cereals, their camps were burnt, they were imprisoned, and sometimes shot. On the other hand, if they did not supply the Patriots with victuals or if they refused to pay taxes in support of the resistance they were subjected to punitive operations by the guerrillas. Suffering from Italian interference and Patriot levies and from punitive action

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¹ Op. cit., p. 60.

164

THE SECOND ITALO-SANUSI WAR

*175 by both sides, many came to the conclusion that they were better
*648 off fighting in the Patriot bands than living under Italian
*795 protection.

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That all Cyrenaica was hard hostile rock beneath the shallowest covering of local collaboration is shown by the fact that the guerrillas kept up their numbers till the end of the war in spite of the slaughter of many times the number of men engaged at any one time in operations. Whenever a man fell there was another to take his place. Apart from the connivance of the whole Bedouin population at Patriot activities it was not easy for the Italians to tell the difference between a Bedouin who was a guerrilla and a Bedouin who belonged to one of the submitted sections. The guerrillas had no uniforms and when defeated had only to disperse and hide their rifles to become harmless shepherds. The Italians found that killed and captured guerrillas all possessed Italian identity cards issued to them when in camps in the guise of *sottomessi*. The Italians were thus victualling directly the forces opposed to them, for any holder of one of their cards could draw Italian rations. I have myself met Bedouin ex-guerrillas who, wounded in a fight, went to Italian hospitals for treatment, pretending to have been shot by the guerrillas while defending their flocks.

Italian writers who themselves experienced at first hand the sense of insecurity and the feeling, slowly mounting to a conviction, that their efforts to win over the Bedouin by bribes were as vain as their hopes of a speedy conquest, have described the situation of disillusionment in which their despondency was born. Biagio Pace writes that there did not exist, in reality, submitted and rebels, the entire population of Cyrenaica being under the control of the leaders of the rebellion, thus constituting a demographic, political, and financial whole, which maintained a force in the field. The *sottomessi* were regularly taxed to provide the guerrilla bands with food, arms, ammunition, clothes, money, and all the other requirements of war and life, and no-one escaped this levy. Pastoral nomads, urban merchants, agriculturists, even the police irregulars, made their contributions to maintain the rebellion. Even the tribal Shaikhs who received subsidies from the Government gave a tithe to 'Umar al-Mukhtar. The entire country was a capillary system of roots which fed from their hidden depths the visible foliage

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THE SECOND ITALO-SANUSI WAR

*175 When things were quiet members of a band would have their
*648 families and herds with them and live in their own tents, but
*795 when pressed they left their women and children and beasts in
201 the tents of the submitted population and the only non-
619 combatants in their camps would then be a few female cooks.
[22] Before the end of the war many of the Patriots, including Sidi
Umar, had sent their families to Egypt so that they could act
more freely.

*175 There was also a general administration for all the bands and
*648 this came directly under Sidi 'Umar. They maintained inter-
*795 communication and worked to a common strategy. Guerrilla
793 headquarters had also to arrange for the collection of a tithe
701 from the entire population to help pay for the expenses of the
619 campaign. Throughout the war Sidi 'Umar's tax-collectors were
[651] taking tithes from the submitted population, not always with-
out trouble, and were giving written receipts for the payments.

The tithe paid by each tribe went to support its own band. Sidi
[105] 'Umar had also to arrange for caravans to bring supplies from
Egypt, and to supervise their distribution to the armed forces
and the payment of customs dues on what went to the civilian
population. Sidi 'Umar also kept up correspondence with
Sayyid Idris and Sanusi elements and sympathizers in Egypt.

*175 The guerrilla bands were in constant contact with the enemy.
*648 One of the most striking features of the campaign was the
*795 frequency of the fighting. At some point or other on the plateau
a skirmish or larger engagement took place every few days for
nearly nine years during the spring and summer months. In
the account of the campaign which follows I mention but few
of these fights, those which had exceptional importance for the
campaign as a whole or as examples of the scale of the fighting.
The few mentioned are therefore no indication of the amount of
fighting. Its frequency may be judged by Gen. Graziani's state-
ment that in the final year of the war, when resistance, com-
pared with earlier years, was feeble and sporadic, there took
place 53 engagements (*combattimenti*) and 210 skirmishes (*con-
flitti*).¹

This incessant fighting cannot, as I have already said, be
described in the language of text-book logistics in terms of
manœuvring, objectives, and battles. Indeed, the Italians had

¹ *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, vol. vi (I), 1932, pp. 52-3.

SONS OF ISHMAEL

619 The independent Sa'adi tribes fall into four groups :

1. The Jawazi, Fawayid, and Rammah, all of common origin with the 'Awaqir of Cyrenaica.
2. The Harabi and Bar'asa, both of common origin with the 'Ibeidat of Cyrenaica.
3. The Hanadi, and
4. The Awlad 'Ali

[173] The original ancestor whom these Sa'adi all claim is one Abu Dib, said to be of Suleim descent.

175 This sheikh was a real personage and a contemporary
554 of Ibn Khaldun (who died in A.D. 1406). He was sheikh
619 of the Beni Ja'afir, and a man of great importance in Barka,
the very place that the four tribes inhabited for centuries before they came to Egypt. Also the period of fifteen or sixteen generations, which the modern Bedouin assert to separate them from Abu Dib, agrees with this chronology well enough.¹

619 Some are found to assert that their title of Sa'adi "helping"
[173] is derived from an ancestress called Sa'ada, the wife of Abu Dib, or, according to a hostile account, of a Jew called Yana. But the real explanation of the term has already been given above.

619 At the present day a sort of feudal system prevails both
• 651 in Egypt and Cyrenaica, by which families are *mrabit*,² or vassal families, not tribes to tribes ; thus the Qat'an tribe of Murabitin is divided, one part vassal to a family of Awlad 'Ali el-Ahmar, another to the Sinaqra, and a third to the Sinana. For a tribute called "alms", which by hereditary obligation each Mrabit family must pay, the Sa'adi family to which it is attached is bound to afford the Mrabit family protection in all minor difficulties of life, such as robbery by another family of Sa'adi, etc.

Thus a "Mrabit" family by paying tribute can herd its flocks in peace, calling upon the Sa'adi to see that justice is done them, but they are bound to join the Sa'adi to fight with them in any serious conflict with other tribes.

Among the "Mrabit" tribes of the present day are the Jumei'at, Qat'an, and Awlad Suleiman, all claiming as common ancestor one Ka'b, and feudal relations are

¹ The pedigrees of which these Western Bedouin are so proud can only be trusted so far back as the individual whose name a subdivision has adopted, such as Kharûf in the Awlad Kharûf pedigree. Taking them separately, the pedigrees will be found to dovetail into each other up to that point, but beyond it things become problematical.

² Sing. of "Murabitin".

THE WESTERN BEDOUIN

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maintained to this day in the desert between the last two and the Sa'adi, though they are relaxed in the cultivation.

The Jumei'at, who used to be "Murabitin" to the Beni 'Una, are now nominally so to the Awlad 'Ali, but are not required to pay tribute. Other tribes, such as the Jawabis and 'Awarma, are in an intermediate stage between the Sa'adi and the Murabitin. The Awlad 'Abd es-Sallam, the Samalus ed-Diminat, and perhaps the Fawakhir, call themselves "Murabitin bil Baraka", a priestly caste which, in Tripoli, used to receive special privileges from the Turkish Government. [778]

Though the Sa'adi tribes despise the Murabitin as serfs, they respect them for their piety and resort to them for the writing of charms. [186]

While the Murabitin tribes generally may be suspected to contain more Libyan blood than the Sa'adi, there are other tribes such as the 'Amayim, the Jahama, and the Tarhuna, who have come to Egypt from further west than any of the above, and who seem to be quite definitely "Berber", though, of course, none of them will admit it. These are known euphemistically as 'Arab el-Gharb.

Even some of the Juheina, settled east of the Nile in Sharqiya, are scorned by Klippel as "d'origine berbère, se pretendant section d'une tribu d'Arabie".¹

Awlad 'Ali.—This tribe, by far the most important of the Western Bedouin, occupies with its vassals the whole north coast of Egypt from Salum to Alexandria. Like the others, they claim descent from the Beni Suleim, alleging their ancestor 'Ali, son of 'Aqar, to be a grandson of that Dib, or Abu Dib, mentioned by Ibn Khaldun. Their enemies, however, allege that he was a Jew. "When the Arabs occupied the north coast of Africa, there was a notable, a Jew, who owned property at Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco. This man welcomed and entertained the Arab sheikh Ez-Zanati. He became very popular with the sheikh, who gave him his daughter named Sa'ada, on condition that he embraced Islam before the marriage contract was made out."² Another version calls the Jew Yana, and says that he had two daughters. Of these Sa'ada was the [131]
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¹ E. Klippel, "Etudes sur le folklore Bédouin de l'Égypte," *Bull. Soc. Khédiv. de Géogr.*, vii, [113]
10, Cairo, 1911.

² From information collected by Muhammad Bey Wasfi.